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I. INTRODUCTION
Article 8 of the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms1 ("Convention")
protects a wide range of rights Apart from its general
applicability to the citizenry of a member state, Article 8 also
limits the state's power in the prison context Dankevich v.
Ukraine4 examined a member state's limitations on prisoner
correspondence However, the European Court of Human Rights
("ECHR") found Ukraine in violation of Article 8 without a
complete Article 8 analysis.6
Given the context of prisoner treatment in Dankevich, the
ECHR's Article 8 analysis should have embraced principles
articulated in international instruments on prisoner rights. While
its holding was correct, the ECHR offered only cursory analytical
7support for its defense of prisoner rights of correspondence. As a
result, future interpretations of correspondence limitations for
prisoners under Article 8 remain ambiguous. This Note analyzes
the shortcomings in Dankevich and explores how stronger support
for its holding may be found.
1. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, art. 8, May 6, 1963, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights].
2. LUKE CLEMENTS ET AL., EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS: TAKING A CASE UNDER
THE CONVENTION 176-186 (2d ed 1999).
3. See EUROPEAN COMMISSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS CASE-LAW TOPICS, HUMAN
RIGHTS IN PRISON 20 (1971). Most prisoner cases dealing with Article 8 deal with the
censoring of correspondence. See, e.g., Klamecki v. Poland, App. No. 31583/96, 39 Eur.
H.R. Rep. 7 (2003).
4. Dankevich v. Ukraine, App. No. 40679/98, 38 Eur. H.R. Rep. 25, 542 (2003).
5. Id.
6. Dankevich at 576.
7. Id.
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Part II provides the factual background for the Dankevich
case. Part III describes the three prongs of an Article 8 analysis
and the ECHR's application of that analysis in Dankevich. Part
III.A examines the first prong of the Article 8 analysis ("in
accordance with the law") and considers an alternative test for the
prison context. In Part III.B, this Note examines the second prong
("necessary in a democratic society") and offers other
international instruments on prisoner rights as sources to
strengthen the ECHR's position. Part III.C covers the third prong
(legitimate aims) and discusses its waning significance in Article 8
analysis in the context of prisoner rights of correspondence.
Finally, Part IV offers some concluding remarks on the Dankevich
opinion.
II. FACTS OF THE CASE
On April 3, 1997, Mr. Yuriy Oleksandr Dankevich was
convicted of three counts of murder and one count of attempted
murder.8 His conviction carried a death sentence, and he was
subsequently imprisoned to await his execution after further
appeals.9
By the end of 1997, Mr. Dankevich filed a final request of
clemency with the President of Ukraine." His mother and wife
also attempted extraordinary appeals with the Supreme Court of
Ukraine.' The President declared a moratorium on all state
executions. 2 In 1999, the Constitutional Court held that capital
punishment contradicted Ukraine's Constitution and commuted
all death sentences into life imprisonments. 3
While Mr. Dankevich's execution was under consideration,
the government detained him in two separate facilities. 14 Mr.
Dankevich filed a petition with the European Commission of
Human Rights arguing that his treatment in prison violated
Articles 3, 8, and 13 of the Convention."






14. Id. at 549. Mr. Dankevich stayed at Zaporizhie Prison no. 2 for three years before
moving to Zaporizhie Prison no. 1. Id.
15. Id. at 542.
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During his detention, three sets of laws controlled his right of
correspondence.16 The first two laws were the Correctional Labour
Code ("the Code"), which covered general detention conditions
for all prisoners, and an Instruction ("the Instruction"), which
determined the conditions of prisoners subject to capital
punishment. 7 Since Mr. Dankevich was a prisoner and for a time
subject to capital punishment, both of these laws applied 8
These laws determined Mr. Dankevich's conditions until July
11, 1999 when a new set of laws called the Temporary Provisions
took effect.' 9 Compared with the Instruction, the Temporary
Provisions lessened restrictions on prisoners subject to capital
punishment. 0 The ECHR found that the Code and the Instruction
both violated Article 8, but the Temporary Provisions did not.2
In its Article 8 analysis, the ECHR discussed prison
regulations on the applicant's incoming and outgoing
correspondence. Article 8(1) of the Convention states that
"[e]veryone has the right to respect for his private and family life,
his home and his correspondence., 23 Article 8(2) limits the
government's ability to interfere with this right to the extent that
there is a legitimate aim that is "in accordance with the law and is
necessary in a democratic society.,
24
The ECHR found the Instruction and the Code in violation of
Article 8 because Ukraine did not publish the Instruction and did
not draft the Code with enough precision. 25 The ECHR upheld the
Temporary Provisions on the ground that it advanced a legitimate
16. Id. at 574.
17. Id. at 558-59, 574. Articles 41 and 43 of the Correction Labour Code provided for
the correspondence restrictions of prisoners. Id. at 558-59. The Instruction was "issued by
the Ministry of Justice, the Prosecutor General and the Supreme Court. Id. at 574.
18. Id. at 574.
19. Id. at 575. See infra note 25. Apparently, in an effort to be more compliant with
the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights, Ukraine modified its prison
regulations. Id. at 562.
20. Id. at 556.
21. Id. at 574-76.
22. Id. at 573.
23. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights, supra note 1, art. 8(1).
24. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights, supra note 1, art. 8(2).
25. The Court found a violation of Article 8 from September 11, 1997 to July 11, 1999
and found no violation after July 11, 1999. Dankevich at 577. The effective date of new
prison regulations on Mr. Dankevich's correspondence explains the time difference in
finding violations. Id. at 575.
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21
aim.
III. ANALYSIS FOR DETERMINING AN ARTICLE 8 VIOLATION
To determine a violation under Article 8, the ECHR applies a
27three-prong test. Article 8(2) of the Convention states:
There shall be no interference by a public authority with the
exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the
law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of
national security, public safety or the economic well-being of
the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the
protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the
rights and freedoms of others. 8
Accordingly, to justify a restriction on any of the rights
guaranteed in Article 8(1), the court must find that the restriction:
(1) is in accordance with the law; (2) is necessary in a democratic
society; and (3) has any of the legitimate aims listed in Article
8(2).
The ECHR applied the first prong of the above test to two
different sets of laws.3° It also applied the third prong to a new set
of laws that came into effect during Mr. Dankevich's prison term. 1
However, the ECHR discussed these prongs only to a very limited
32extent. Thus, a case that fully applies the Article 8 test to prison
correspondence regulations remains to be seen, despite a growing
body of international instruments on the subject. Subsequent
interpretations of prisoner correspondence restrictions under
Article 8, therefore, have received little foundation from
Dankevich. Moreover, a deeper discussion would have helped to
avoid the analytical discrepancies inherent to the prison context.
Part III analyzes how a thorough Article 8 analysis would
have strengthened the ECHR's holding. Furthermore, this part
offers alternate factors that are implied from other international
instruments and would also serve as a stronger basis for protecting
the right of correspondence and' monitoring its restriction on the
26. Id. at 575-76.
27. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights, supra note 1, art. 8(2).
28. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights, supra note 1, art. 8(2).
29. Id.
30. Dankevich at 573-75.
31. Id. at 575-76.
32. Id. at 574-76.
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imprisoned.
A. "In Accordance with the Law"
The first prong in Article 8 analysis is three-fold: (1) the law
must have "some basis in domestic law,, 33 (2) the law must be
accessible (i.e., published), and (3) the law must be understandable
enough for one to know which of his actions might foreseeably
apply to the law.34 Using parts of this test, the ECHR examined all
three laws that applied to Mr. Dankevich's prison conditions.35 The
Instruction and the Code both failed on different grounds;
respectively, the failure to publish the law (which affects
accessibility) and poor drafting of the law (which limits
foreseeability) .36
1. Basis in Domestic Law
To meet this element, the law in question must first be
included somewhere in the body of domestic law.37 The ECHR
38
defined this element in Huvig v. France. In Huvig, the ECHR
determined that case law ("unwritten law") and statutes ("written
law") both comprise the empowered law of the land.39 Enactments
at various levels of government (e.g., agencies) are also considered
law but are of "lower rank than statutes."
40
The Huvig decision recognized the difference in common law
and civil law traditions (the law of "Continental" countries, as
33. Id. at 574.
34. Kruslin v. France, 176 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 6,20 (1990).
35. Dankevich at 574-76.
36. Id. at 575-76.
37. Huvig v. France, 176-B Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 39, 52 (1990). Earlier ECHR case
law closely examined what the meaning of "law" was within the Convention for Protection
of Human Rights. Id. at 53. The ECHR has stated that an analysis of the "in accordance
with the law" language of Article 8(2) should be identical to the "prescribed by
law/prevues par la loi" language of Article 10(2). Silver v. United Kingdom, 61 Eur. Ct.
H.R. (ser. A) at 32-37 (1979). "Indeed, this must be so, particularly because the two
provisions overlap as regards freedom of expression through correspondence and not to
give them an identical interpretation could lead to different conclusions in respect of the
same interference." Id. at 33.
38. Huvig at 53-54.
39. Id. See also The Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, 30-A Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at
31 (1979). Perhaps a helpful way to understand this distinction is that "unwritten" laws are
non-legislatively drafted laws while "written" laws are drafted by the legislature.
40. Huvig at 53-54.
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Huvig refers to it) and accordingly emphasized the need to
embrace all legal traditions within the ECHR's interpretation of
Article 8. 4' The result is a broad interpretation of what is
incorporated into the scope of this element.•T
In Dankevich, the ECHR did not address the question of
whether the laws were "enactments of law., 43 Since the laws were
adopted and passed properly, the laws seemingly satisfy this
element without obstacle.4
After determining whether the enactment is a "law" under
Article 8, the inquiry then focuses on whether the government's
interference in the individual's right of correspondence has some
"basis in domestic law."45 This subsequent analysis is trivial when
considered alongside the above analysis, and is only clarified
through the next two elements.46
Overall, however, this element is too broad. In an effort to
include enactments of law by all levels of government, the ECHR
now classifies almost anything as having a "basis in domestic law."
The breadth of this element presents no controversy for any
Article 8 challenge.
2. Accessibility of the Law
A law is adequately accessible if it is a published work or
available to the citizenry.7 Although this element seemingly
contradicts the ECHR's position that "unwritten" laws have a
basis in the law,48 the ECHR clarified that even unwritten case law
is often accessible through published sources.49 The Instruction
failed to satisfy this element because it was circulated internally
41. Id.
42. See generally P. VAN DIJK & G.J.H VAN HOOF, THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE
EUROPEAN CONVENTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 765-767 (3d ed., Kluwer Law International
1998).
43. Dankevich at 573-75.
44. Id. at 573-75. Specifically, the Ministry of Justice, the Prosecutor General, and the
Supreme Court issued the Instruction on April 20, 1998. Id. at 554, 574. The Temporary
Provisions were enacted on June 25, 1999. Id. at 556.
45. VAN DIJK & VAN HOOF, supra note 42, at 767.
46. Id. at 767-68 ("[T]he principle [of an interference having basis in domestic law] is
rather trivial and it has, consequently, been qualified in the case-law so as to include [the
foreseeability and accessibility] requirement[s].").
47. The Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, 30-A Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 31 (1979).
48. Huvig v. France, 176-B Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 39 at 53-54.
49. The Sunday Times, 30-A Eur. Ct. H.R. at 31.
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within government offices and was not available to the public.0
Indeed, the deciding factor for the ECHR in finding an Article 8
violation here was the lack of accessibility.51
The purpose of the second element is to ensure that citizens
at large (i.e., the persons immediately subject to the law) can
readily obtain the law.52 However, the fact that the very persons
immediately subject to the law-prisoners-are not in the public at
large complicates the analysis.53 To get around this complication,
the ECHR in Dankevich implied a dual accessibility requirement
for regulations impacting prisoners."
However, dual accessibility as the ECHR understands it
produces a contradictory result. Prison administrators in
Dankevich posted the rights and obligations of prisoners
throughout their prison sentence.5 Thus, persons immediately
subject to the law (prisoners) had access-albeit short access-to
the prison rules.56 Nevertheless, since the public did not have
access to these prison rules, the ECHR determined that the
accessibility element was not met.57 Prisoners need access to the
laws since laws immediately impact them; at the same time, the
public needs access to the laws in order to keep the government
accountable. 8 Presumably, if prisoners were mistreated while
imprisoned under laws only accessible to prisoners, the public
would still demand reform and prisoners would still be informed of
their limited rights.59 On the other hand, laws fully accessible to the
public at large but not to prisoners might keep prisoners
uninformed of restrictions on their rights. Indeed, how does dual
50. Dankevich at 575. The ECHR simply stated that the Code met the accessibility
requirement without discussing the reasons and did not mention accessibility in its
discussion about the Temporary Provisions. Id. at 574-76.
51. Id. at 575.
52. The Sunday Times, 30-A Eur. Ct. H.R. at 31.
53. Dankevich at 575.
54. Id. at 574-75.
55. Id. at 549-51.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 575.
58. See The Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, 30-A Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 31
(1979).
59. Prisoner family members and prisoner rights organizations (e.g., Amnesty
International) monitor prison regulations to ensure humane treatment and would lobby
for reform if the laws were too restrictive. See Amnesty International,
http://www.amnesty.org.
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accessibility benefit the rights of prisoners any more?
If prison officials kept Mr. Dankevich fully informed of the
prison rules at all times while the laws themselves were not
published to the public, could a violation still be found? The
ECHR seems to imply that public access to prison regulations is
more important than prisoner access. Mr. Dankevich read the laws
that affected his daily activities, but this access by itself was not
enough to meet the requirement. By the ECHR's reasoning, a law
is not accessible if the public cannot obtain it, even if the persons
most immediately affected by it can.
If the goal of accessibility is keeping the individuals who are
immediately subject to the law informed of it, then mandatory
internal distribution in prison, along with public availability of
prison regulations upon request, would strike a better balance
between the rights of prisoners and public accountability. The
public has an interest in prisoner treatment; accordingly, it has an
interest in these laws and should have access to them. Thus, under
this analytic model, published laws necessarily would have a
presumption of public access;60 while unpublished laws would shift
the burden onto the government to prove adequate accessibility
where the public makes a request. However, it is prisoners
themselves who must have constant and complete access to the
law. The ECHR's discussion lacked a thorough analysis of
accessibility needs for the public and for prisoners. This deficiency
may cause ambiguities for future cases applying Article 8 to
prisoner correspondence.
3. Foreseeability of the Law
The foreseeability requirement asks whether one can regulate
one's conduct and foresee the legal consequences of one's
actions.6' The ECHR has recognized that most laws necessitate a
degree of flexibility that makes absolute foreseeability
62 oimpossible. The focus of this requirement, therefore, as expressed
in Dankevich, rests on proper drafting of the law.63 The Code
failed the foreseeability element because the text of the rules was
60. See The Sunday Times, 30-A Eur. Ct. H.R. at 31.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Dankevich at 574-75. For an example of imprecise statute drafting, refer to
Kruslin v. France, 176 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 6, 22-25 (1990).
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poorly written and did not clearly indicate whether the rules
applied to prisoners serving death sentences.6
Article 8's foreseeability analysis, however, provides no real
safeguard for prisoners because all of their actions are limited .
Upon detention, a prisoner anticipates that prison authorities will
monitor and control everything that a prisoner does. Only the
most ambiguous laws will cause uncertainty about foreseeable
consequences. In Mr. Dankevich's case, it was unclear whether he
was allowed a specific number of parcels or whether he was
prohibited from receiving parcels at all.66 Undoubtedly, prison
officials would limit his correspondence one way or another.
If foreseeability merely requires proper statutory drafting, as
Dankevich suggests, 7 then the Convention falls short of protecting
prisoners' interests. The ECHR missed a chance to refine its
explanation of foreseeability and ensure a modest legal safeguard
for prisoners. The analysis should determine whether a prisoner
fully comprehends the extent of limitations while detained.
Appropriate measures might include reading of the written rulesS• 68
for those who are illiterate and a discussion of prison rules andregulations during prisoner orientation.69
64. Id. at 574-75. The ECHR did not discuss foreseeability for the Instructions or the
Temporary Provisions.
65. See generally Stephen Livingstone, Prisoners' Rights in the Context of the
European Convention of Human Rights, 2 PUNISHMENT & SOCIETY 309, 312 (2000). The
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights was based on the norm of "a democratic
society of autonomous and equal individuals who participate in both public and private
life." Id. Prisoners, in comparison, live in an environment where their rights (liberty,
privacy, and movement) are systematically denied; thus, the Article 8 analysis immediately
proceeds to the three-prong test. Id. An insightful and related discussion on the doctrine
of "inherent limitations" where certain rights are inherently limited based on a person's
status (including prisoner status) is in VAN DIJK & VAN HOOF, supra note 42, at 763-65.
66. Dankevich at 574-75.
67. Id.
68. Literacy rates for Ukraine are at 99.7%. CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, WORLD
FACTBOOK UKRAINE, http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/up.html (2005).
However, the statistic counts as literate those individuals over the age of 15 who can read
and write. Id. It is unclear what level of literacy is needed to understand the laws that
apply to prisoners.
69. Of particular note is Ukrainian authorities who state that educating prisoners
"appreciably contributes to ... their social adaptation after release and the prevention of
recidivism." ROY WALMSLEY, FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS IN THE PRISON SYSTEMS OF
CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE: ACHIEVEMENTS, PROBLEMS AND OBJECTIVES 514,
http://www.heuni.fi/24705.htm (2003). Further, Ukraine has continuing efforts to increase
the level of education in prisons by implementing secondary education facilities. Response
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Overall, the test of whether the regulations are "in
accordance with the law" is better upheld by a principle of
transparency whereby prisoners upon detention have immediate
access to regulations that limit their freedoms. As a secondary
matter, the rules should be also available to the public at large to
protect society's interest in maintaining humane prison conditions
that comply with human and legal rights.7°
B. "Necessary in a Democratic Society"
The second element needed to justify a restriction of
freedoms under Article 8 is that the restriction must be "necessary
in a democratic society."'" Any restriction must correspond to a
"pressing social need" and be "proportionate to the legitimate aim
pursued.7 2 Sometimes this standard is described as a test of
proportionality in which interference with freedoms by a public
authority must be both minimal and justified."
"The scale the [ECHR] utilises seems to imply that the more
far-reaching the infringement or the more essential the aspect of
the right that has been interfered with, the more substantial or
compelling the legitimate aims pursued must be., 74 In the context
of prison regulations, the balancing test must be carefully made to
protect both the government's interest in keeping dangerous
individuals apart from society and the prisoner's interest in
enjoying fair treatment.75
The Dankevich opinion only addressed this point for the
of the Ukrainian Government to the Report of the European Committee for the
Prevention of Torture and Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (2004),
http://www.cpt.coe.int/documents/ukr/2004-35-inf-eng.htm.
70. The public maintains an interest in the administration of prisons by the
government. See Suzanne M. Bernard, An Eye For an Eye: The Current Status of
International Law on the Human Treatment of Prisoners, 25 RUTGERS L.J. 759 (1994).
71. Silver v. United Kingdom, 61 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 37-38 (1979).
72. Handyside v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 22-23 (1976).
73. CLARE OVEY & ROBIN C.A. WHITE, JACOBS & WHITE, EUROPEAN
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 209 (3rd ed. 2002).
74. VAN DIJK & VAN HOOF, supra note 42, at 537.
75. See Rees v. United Kingdom 106 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 15 (1987) ("fair balance
that has to be struck between the general interest of the community and the interests of
the individual"). In other words, under the "necessary in a democratic society"
requirement, the government must show that the restriction allows a way for it to assert its
interest (the necessity branch) and protect the individual (the implied "demonstrability"
branch) at the same time. Id.
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Temporary Provisions, by holding that the government had an
interest in regulating the volume of correspondence at prisons. 6
The ECHR's discussion was a factual recitation of prison
conditions that favored the Ukraine's discretion over undertaking
a full balancing test analysis in which that discretion might very
well have been limited 7 This cursory analysis was not enough.
Failure to elaborate on this element may disadvantage future
interpretations of correspondence under Article 8. It is not
unusual for the ECHR to refer to international instruments
beyond the Convention to help decide its case." In fact, a
substantial set of international instruments exists that supports a
balancing test for prisoner rights. 9
Many of these instruments apply a similar balancing test and
offer special nuances in the contours of the right of
correspondence for imprisoned persons;80 as such, the ECHR
should have referred to these instruments for guidance. Two of the
most important international instruments addressing prisoner
treatment are provided below.
76. Dankevich at 573-76.
77. Id. at 575-76. The ECHR allowed Ukraine a margin of appreciation in regulating
prison life. See generally HOWARD CHARLES YOUROw, THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION
DOCTRINE IN THE DYNAMICS OF EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE 92-95
(1996) (discussing prisoners rights under Article 8 and the doctrine of the margin of
appreciation).
78. X. and Y. v. Switzerland, App. No. 8166/78, 13 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep.
241, 243 (1978) (citing to the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners).
See also CLEMENTS ET AL., supra note 2, at 183 ("This is, however, an area where the
Court and Commission have shown a willingness to adapt their views in line with prison
reform and changing public attitudes.").
79. Bernard, supra note 70, at 764.
80. A related body to the ECHR is the European Committee for the Prevention of
Torture ("ECPT"). The ECPT also has standards apart from the ECHR. For a discussion
on the ECPT's relationship to the ECHR, read WOLFGANG PEUKERT, PROTECTING
PRISONERS: THE STANDARDS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMITITEE FOR THE PREVENTION
OF TORTURE IN CONTEXT 86-102 (Rod Morgan & Malcom D. Evans eds., 1999). Another
related international instrument is the Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons
under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, A/RES/43/173 76th plenary meeting 9
December 1988, Principle 19. Principle 19 states that "[a] detained or imprisoned person
shall have the right to be visited by and to correspond with, in particular, members of his
family and shall be given adequate opportunity to communicate with the outside world,
subject to reasonable conditions and restrictions as specified by law or lawful regulations."
Id. Also, see the United Nations ("UN") Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of
their Liberty, G.A. res. 45/113, art. 59-62, Annex, 45 U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., Supp. No.
49A, U.N. Doc. A/45/49 (Dec. 14, 1990) (giving a broader explanation for the rights of
correspondence).
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1. Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("UDHR") Article
12.81
The UDHR is universal (at least in theory) and has been in
existence since 1948.12 As the most general starting point of
international instruments, the UDHR supplies some of the most
recognized articulations of human rights.8 For over fift% years, the
UDHR has been a document of unprecedented status. The most
relevant article of the UDHR for the purposes of this Note is
Article 12. Article 12 creates a similar right of correspondence as
articulated in Article 8 of the Convention.
Article 12 states that "no one shall be subjected to arbitrary
interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor
to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right
to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks."
8 1
The language of Article 12 implies that all persons bear
inherent rights concerning privacy, family, home and
correspondence. 86 These rights cannot be abridged by a
government's "arbitrary interference., 87 If it occurs, all people
have "the right to the protection of the law," meaning that the law
must permit individuals to remedy the interference.m
The UDHR states broad principles and is neither as detailed
as an international convention would be, nor is it legally binding
on signatories in the same way that treaties or conventions are.
Accordingly, the definition of "arbitrary interference" is left vague
and may encompass any interference, including non-governmental
interference. This Note conceives of the UDHR as a floor below
which national and other supranational laws cannot fall.9°
81. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810,
art. 12 (1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
82. See JOHANNES MORSINK, THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAR RIGHTS
(1999).
83. See generally Anne F. Bayefsky, The Legacy of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, 5 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 261 (1999).
84. MORSINK, supra note 82, at xii.
85. UDHR, supra note 81.
86. MORSINK, supra note 82, at 134.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 134-39.
89. Id. at 15; Bernard, supra note 70, at 769.
90. See also International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A,
art. 7, 17, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171,
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For prisoners, the UDHR supports the balancing test in
Article 8 of the Convention. While no guidance may be available
as to the meaning of "arbitrary interference," the UDHR still
supports the idea that even prisoners have inherent rights of
correspondence that cannot be denied.
2. United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment
of Prisoners ("SMRTP"), Rules 27 and 3791
Apart from general principles of human rights articulated in
the UDHR, model prison standards comprise an area of "soft
law 92 that influences the creation of prison rules.93 Unlike other
areas of international law, no international convention covers
prisoner treatment or prisoner rights exclusively. 94 Given this void,
model standards dealing with prisoner treatment are particularly
important.
The SMRTP is the most significant of the model standards
that deal with the treatment of prisoners.95 The purpose of the
entered into force Mar. 23, 1976, [hereinafter CCPR]. Construing the prisoners' right of
correspondence under the CCPR should be the same as for the UDHR since the language
of the CCPR tracks the language of the UDHR. Id. CCPR's Article 7 has the exact same
language as UDHR's Article 5, and CCPR Article 17 has the same language as UDHR's
Article 12. Id. Unlike the UDHR, however, the CCPR has an optional protocol which
provides an additional mechanism for enforcement for signatory countries that have
signed onto it. Optional Protocol to the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. AIRES/57/199 (Dec. 18,
2002). Under the Optional Protocol, an individual whose rights have been violated by a
signatory state and whose domestic remedies have been exhausted may make submissions
to the CCPR committee. Id. The signatory state must then address the violation to the
committee's satisfaction.
91. U.N. Dep't of Econ. & Soc. Affairs, First U.N. Cong. on Prevention of Crime &
Treatment of Offenders, Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, U.N.
Doc. AICONF./6/1 E.S.C. (May 13, 1977) available at http://www.ohchr.org/english/law/
treatmentprisoners.htm [hereinafter SMRTPj.
92. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1426 (8th ed. 2004) defines "soft law" in the
international law context as "[gluidelines, policy declarations, or codes of conduct that set
standards of conduct but are not legally binding." See also Tadeusz Gruchalla-Wesierski,
A Framework for Understanding Soft Law, 30 MCGILL L.J. 37 (1984). For a discussion on
the difference between "soft" international law and "hard" international law, see Jose E.
Alvarez, The New Dispute Settlers: (Half) Truths and Consequences, 38 TEX. INT'L L.J. 405
(2003).
93. Jiri Toman, Quasi-Legal Standards and Guidelines for Protecting Human Rights,
GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICE 203 (Hurst Hannum ed., 3d ed.,
Transnational Publishers 1999).
94. Bernard, supra note 70, at 770-71.
95. Id.
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SMRTP is to encourage countries to adopt standard provisions
within their own penal codes.96 It provides for the minimum
conditions for prisoner treatment.97 Rule 37 provides for the right
of correspondence subject to "necessary supervision.
98
"[N]ecessary supervision" is qualified by the necessity test in rule
27, which limits restrictions on prison life only to what is necessary
to maintain discipline and order.99
SMRTP Rule 27 provides: "[D]iscipline and order shall be
maintained with firmness, but with no more restriction than is
necessary for safe custody and well-ordered community life."' °
This rule supports the general principle of maintaining order with
the least restriction needed.' It is similar to Article 8's balancing
test because the state cannot make restrictions beyond a minimal
level of necessity.
02
Rule 37 states that "[p]risoners shall be allowed under
necessary supervision to communicate with their family and
reputable friends at regular intervals, both by correspondence and
by receiving visits."' 3 This rule deals specifically with a prisoner's
right of correspondence. Here, the language is also one of where
the government must show enough necessity ("necessary
supervision") to fulfill the supervision required for prison.'
04
The "necessary in a democratic society" prong of the Article 8
balancing test deserves- a deeper analysis in light of other
influential international instruments on prisoner rights.105 Not only
would it strengthen the legitimacy of the Convention's
interpretation concerning prisoners, it would also enhance the
understanding of correspondence rights for prisoners.
96. Daniel L. Skoler, World Implementation of the United Nations Standard Minimum
Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, 10 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 453 (1975).
97. SMRTP, supra note 91, rule 2.
98. SMRTP, supra note 91, rule 37.
99. SMRTP, supra note 91, rule 27.
100. Id.
101. See COMM'N ON CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES & SERV., AMERICAN BAR ASS'N,
ANALYSIS OF EXTENT OF APPLICABILITY OF THE UN STANDARD MINIMUM RULES FOR
THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS TO COMMUNITY-BASED SUPERVISION AND
RESIDENTIAL CARE FOR CoNVICrED OFFENDERS 12-13 (1974).
102. Id.
103. SMRTP, supra note 91.
104. Id.
105. See X. and Y. v. Switzerland, supra note 78 and accompanying text.
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C. Legitimate Aims
The third prong of Article 8 is whether the government has a
legitimate aim. Legitimate aims listed in Article 8(2) are:
national security, public safety or the economic well-being of
the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the
protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the
rights and freedoms of others. °7
In the context of prisons, the usefulness of this analysis is
questionable because the government will always have a legitimate
interest in detaining criminals and maintaining order within
prisons. 1° The deference extended to governments in meeting this
prong is so broad that it is unlikely that the ECHR will reject the
government's assertion that it is advancing a legitimate aim.10 9 The
focus, then, shifts to whether the legitimate aim is necessary to the
democratic society (i.e., a second prong analysis).10°
In Dankevich, the ECHR never applied the legitimate aims
analysis to the Instruction and the Code because these laws
violated the first prong of Article 8."' However, even though the
106. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights, supra note 1, art. 8(2).
107. Id.
108. See generally, VAN DIJK & VAN HOOF, supra note 42, at 539. Typically, in the
context of prison regulations, the legitimate aim advanced by the government is the
"prevention of disorder or crime." For examples of Member States using the legitimate
aim of preventing disorder or crime, see Klamecki v. Poland, App. No. 31583/96, 39 Eur.
H.R. Rep. 7,165 (2003), and De Wilde, Ooms and Versyp v. Belgium (No. 1), 1 E.H.R.R.
(ser. A) 373 (1970).
109. A few examples include: Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)
at 1 (1982); Buckley v. United Kingdom, 23 E.H.R.R. 101 (1996); Laskey, et al. v. United
Kingdom 1997-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 120; Gaskin Case, 160 Eur. Ct. H.R. (set. A) at 1 (1989). As
an aside, this deference is akin to the U.S. Supreme Court's rational basis test. See Erwin
Chemerinsky, The Deconstitutionalization of Education, 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 111, 132-33
(2004) ("In other words, courts generally should presume that laws are constitutional. As
the Court has noted, a 'more searching judicial inquiry' is appropriate when a law
interferes with individual rights, restricts the ability of the political process to repeal
undesirable legislation, or discriminates against a 'discrete and insular minority."' (quoting
United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938))).
110. Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 1 (1982); Buckley v.
United Kingdom, 23 E.H.R.R. 101 (1996); Laskey, et al. v. United Kingdom 1997-I Eur.
Ct. H.R. 120; Gaskin Case, 160 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 1 (1989).
111. Dankevich at 574-76. Similarly, in Niedbala v. Poland, App. No. 27915/95, 33 Eur.
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ECHR ruled that the Temporary Provisions had a legitimate aim
of preventing disorder and crime, it mainly discussed the second
112
prong.
Two problems arise because this element is rarely discussed in
relation to prisoners. The first problem deals with the second
prong's dependence on the legitimate aim. Proportionate
measures must be balanced with the legitimate aim of the
government.113  It follows that the more legitimate the
government's aim is, the more likely that the measures will be• • • 114
justified. However, if a legitimate aim will always pass muster to
a minimal degree, then the government always wins half the
analysis on the way to proving proportionate measures.115 Thus,
even minimally legitimate aims allow the government to pursue
some sort of restrictive measure. The only hurdle for the
government to overcome is to prove that the restrictions are not
overly extensive.
Second, if an element of Article 8 is always met, then that
element becomes a non-issue for any applicant seeking ECHR
relief."' The automatic upholding of a government's legitimate
aims defeats the purpose of this prong. After all, every
government action ought not to deserve legitimacy at every
occasion of disregard.1 In fact, the very idea of judicial review
implies distrust of government actions which must be monitored
and checked."8
The ECHR should revive its inspection of the legitimate aims
analysis in order to fully credit its usefulness in Article 8.
Dankevich was an opportunity to examine the legitimate aims
H.R. Rep. 48, the ECHR did not discuss the second and third prongs after finding that the
law did not meet the first prong.
112. Dankevich at 576.
113. See discussion, infra Part II.B.
114. See, e.g., Smith v. United Kingdom, 1999-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 45.
115. VAN DIJK & VAN HOOF, supra note 42, at 539 (In the context of a prisoner, "the
Contracting State may be confronted here with less a severe and less probing attitude on
the part of [the ECHR].").
116. VAN DIJK & VAN HOOF, supra note 42, at 539.
117. See VIVIEN HART, DISTRUST AND DEMOCRACY (1978).
118. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW 101-103 (1980). However, in rebuttal to this Note's criticisms of the "legitimate
aims" prong, there is an argument that since the judiciary is an inherently undemocratic
institution, it is improper for it to question excessively the aims of a democratically elected
government, particularly where those aims are not inherently unconstitutional.
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analysis that the ECHR did not take. It may have discussed
whether the interests of preventing disorder or crime are
equivalent for prisoners and the general public. It may have also
examined the interplay between the protection of rights of others
(like non-detained family members of prisoners) with the rights of
prisoners and how this relationship affects the right of
correspondence, such as whether the limited correspondence
rights of prisoners concomitantly limit correspondence rights for
outsiders that want to contact prisoners."' Because of the
ambiguities in analyzing the legitimate aims prong as well as its
growing irrelevance, the ECHR failed to bring guidance for the
right of correspondence for prisoners under Article 8. As a result,
subsequent cases may suffer from these deficiencies.
IV. CONCLUSION
At present, prisoners file more than half of all individual
complaints made to the ECHR."2 When one also considers that
the initial scope of the Convention was for citizens at large
functioning in public and private spheres, one can understand the
greater care which the ECHR must exercise when defining the
limitation of rights under Article 8.121
Despite the proper outcome for Mr. Dankevich, the ECHR
was not careful enough to protect future interpretations of
correspondence limitations under Article 8. The ECHR should
have narrowed both the requirements of finding a domestic law
basis and legitimate aims to enhance their relevance in the
analysis. The ECHR should have defined foreseeability and
accessibility for the circumstances of prisoners as well. The test of
finding legitimate government aims also seems meaningless in this
context. Finally, numerous international instruments on prisoners'
rights offer sufficient support and uniformity for the ECHR to
consider them, especially under its "necessary in a democratic
society" analysis. Dankevich was a missed opportunity for the
119. This Note raises but a few of the many questions that relate to legitimate aims in
the prisoner context.
120. Livingstone, supra note 65, at 309-10; Toman, supra note 93, at 205. See
EUROPEAN COMMISSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS CASE-LAW Topics, supra note 3, at 20
(early statistics on prisoner applicants reached 40% by 1971).
121. Livingstone, supra note 65, at 309.
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ECHR to clarify prisoner rights of correspondence.
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